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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMost models of deposit insurance assume that  the volatility of a 
bank's  assets is exogenously provided.  Although this framework allows 
the  impact  of  volatility  on bankruptcy  costs  and  deposit  insurance 
subsidies to be explored, it is static and does not incorporate the fact 
that  equityholders can respond to market  events by  adjusting previous 
investment and leverage decisions.  This paper presents a dynamic model 
of a bank that allows for such behavior.  The flexibility of being able 
to respond dynamically to market information has value to equityholders. 
The  impact and value  of  this flexibility option are explored under  a 
regime in which flat-rate deposit insurance is provided. 
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Almost  all  models  of  deposit  insurance take  the underlying  source of 
risk, namely, the  volatility of  the  bank's  assets, to  be  exogenously 
provided.  Within  this  framework, the  relative  merits  of  the  firm 
increasing  its volatility  and  leverage  can  be  easily  explored.  The 
disadvantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  is  static  and  does  not 
recognize the fact  that  equityholders can respond  to  market  events by 
dynamically adjusting previous investment and leverage decisions.  Such 
dynamic behavior  can  lead  to  changing  levels of  portfolio  risk  over 
time, with commensurate effects on the value of deposit insurance.  This 
is the classic moral hazard problem.  2 
The objective of this paper is to establish a model that identifies 
how equityholders select a capital structure and investment policy under 
a flat-rate deposit insurance regime.  The model we consider is dynamic 
and  explicitly  incorporates  the  flexibility  option  that  allows 
shareholders to adapt their asset portfolio decisions to market events. 
3 
We  investigate how this flexibility option affects portfolio decisions 
and risk-taking.  Our findings show that with no opportunities to revise 
portfolio decisions, optimal bank financing and investment policies are 
bang-bang;  that is, shareholders will either fully protect the charter 
value or fully exploit the insurance subsidy granted by the insurer.  A 
special case of our one-period model  reduces to  the model developed by 
The 1  i  terature on deposit insurance using an option pricing framework 
was pioneered by  Merton  119771.  For a review of  the  literature, see 
Flood [ 19901. 
The  moral  hazard  problem  has  been  well  discussed  by  Kane  [19851. 
Fixed-rate deposit  insurance  gives  bank  owners  strong  incentives  to 
increase risk.  Kane illustrates that the incentive scheme can become so 
socially perverse that projects with a negative net present value may be 
optimally selected. 
The term "flexibility  option" is derived from the asset option pricing 
literature  and  has  been  discussed  by  Breman  and  Schwartz  [19851, 
McDonald and Siege1 [1985,  19861,  Kester [19841,  and Triantis and Hodder 
[19901. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMarcus t19841.  However, unlike his model, ours allows equityholders to 
select  risks  dynamically  and  therefore  allows  moral  hazard  to  be 
incorporated.  With  a  finite  number  of  portfolio  rebalance  points 
remaining before an audit, bang-bang policies may no longer be  optimal 
and  interior  solutions may  exist.  Finally, we  investigate  how  the 
flexibility option granted to equityholders affects the value of deposit 
insurance.  We  show  that  ignoring  the  flexibility  option  leads  to 
understating  the  value  of  deposit  insurance.  In  particular, as  the 
number of portfolio revisions allowed prior to an audit date increases. 
a bank's  ability to exploit the insured-deposit base  increases.  This 
can only be to the detriment of the flat-rate deposit insuree. 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  I1  develops  a 
one-period model  of a banking firm in which the equityholders optimally 
select their capital structure and their investment policy over the time 
remaining before an audit.  In this case, the firm invests either all or 
none  of  its  wealth  in  risky  assets.  No  interior  solutions  are 
preferable.  Moreover,  under  certain  assumptions, we  show  that  the 
equityholders' interests are best served by supplying the minimum amount 
of capital.  Section I11 extends the analysis to the two-period case and 
shows that interior solutions may be optimal.  Section IV considers the 
case in which multiple portfolio-revision periods remain prior  to  the 
audit.  Numerical illustrations are provided to highlight the fact that 
the  value  of  deposit  insurance  increases  with  the  number  of 
portfolio-revision  opportunities.  Section  V  discusses  policy 
implications and concludes the paper. 
11. A One-Period Model of a Banking Firm 
Consider an insured bank with one period remaining until an audit by 
the insuring agency.  At  the initial time, t=O, the deposit base is 1-a 
and the capital supplied by  the shareholders is a.  Deposits are fully 
insured  by  the  agency, which levies a  fixed-rate premium  per  dollar 
deposited.  Let P(t)  be the value of this deposit insurance net of  the 
premium.  P(t)  can be  viewed  as government-contributed capital.  Since 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe  deposits are  insured, their  value  at  the  end  of  the  period  is 
(l-a)e'*T,  where  r*  is  the  rate  of  return  on  the  deposits.  For 
simplicity, we assume that deposit inflows and outflows are equal over 
this period. 
Depositors, unlike  the bank, may  be  faced with high  transaction 
costs and may be unable to hold the riskless asset directly.  Moreover, 
bank  deposits  may  have  unique  characteristics, such  as  convenience 
yields,  that  make  them  less-than-perfect  substitutes  for  riskless 
assets.  In either  case, barriers  to  entry, such  as the need  for  a 
government  license or  charter, allow banks  to  raise deposits at  rates 
below  the  risk-free  rate,  r.  This  positive  spread  produces  an 
intangible asset, or  charter  value,  in  the  form  of  future monopoly 
rents.  If the charter obtains its value solely from monopolistic rents 
attributable to  the  interest-rate  spread, and  if  this spread  remains 
constant or grows over time, then the charter value equals the deposit 
base, D(O)  =  1-a.  In general,  however, due to deregulation or increased 
competition from other financial intermediaries,  monopolistic rents are 
likely to  erode over  time.  Usually, the  rents are  taken  to  be  some 
function of  the deposit base  at  time  t.  For example, Marcus  [I9841 
assumes that the charter value is a fraction of the deposit base.  Let 
C(0)  represent the present value of this charter.  If the bank fails the 
audit, it  loses its charter.  Thus, at  time 0,  the bank  holds a call 
option on the charter.  Let G(O) be  the value of this claim.  In what 
follows,  we assume that the liability gros  at the risk-free rate; that 
is, r* =  r, with the capitalized value of the deposit spread reflected 
in the charter value. 
We assume that the bank invests 1-q  in riskless discount bonds and 
q  in  risky  securities.  Assuming  no  dividends,  the  risky  portfolio 
follows a diffusion process of the form 
where p  and (I.  are the instantaneous mean and volatility, respectively, 
and dz is the Wiener increment. 
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Assets  Liabilities and Net Worth 
Tangible Assets 
Riskless Asset  1-q 
Risky Asset  q 
Intangible Assets 
Government Subsidy  P(0) 
Charter Value  G(O) 
Total =  1 +  P(O)  +  G(O) 
Deposits  D(O)=l-u 
Shareholder-contributed Capital u 
Government-contributed Capital  P(0) 
I  Charter Value  G(0) 
I  Shareholder  Equity  E(0) 
Total = 1 - u + E(0) 
Clearly, E(0)  = u +  P(0)  +  GIO). 
The initial value of the bank's  tangible assets is V(0)  =  1.  Given 
q,  the value of these assets follows the process 
Conditional on the  capital  structure decision, a, and  the  investment 
decision, q, the value of the tangible assets of the firm at time T is 
2  where x is a normal random variable with mean p - s2/2 and variance s . 
At the audit date, T, the deposit base is D(T)  =  (1-alerT.  If the 
liquidation value  of  the  marketable  assets, V(T),  is  less  than  the 
deposit base, then the bank  is declared insolvent and  the shareholders 
receive  nothing.  If,  however,  the  bank  is  declared  solvent,  the 
equityholders receive a claim worth V(T)  - D(T)  +  G(T).  Let E(T)  be the 
shareholders' equity at time T.  Then,  we have 
{ :(TI  - D(T)  +  G(T)  if V(T)  >  D(T) 
E(T)  = 
otherwise  (1 
Using standard option pricing methods, shareholder equity at time 0  is 
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Shareholders will  raise capital provided  the marginal benefit  of  each 
incremental dollar raised  is positive.  Since we  assume all financial 
assets  are  fairly  priced,  the  tangible-asset portfolio  has  zero net 
present value, and  the shareholders' objective is reduced to maximizing 
Z(a.q),  where 
Z(a,q) = E(a,q;O) - a 
Equation (4)  clearly illustrates the trade-off faced by the shareholders. 
Specifically, in selecting the optimal capital and investment decisions, 
the shareholders trade off the value of the call option on the charter 
(which is maximized by  reducing default risk) and the value of the put 
option (which is maximized by  increasing default risk).  Substituting for 
G(a,q;O) and P(a,q;O), we obtain 
Let 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmz(a*,q*)  =  Max {Z(a,q)) 
o=aa 
0lqS1 
Given  that  the  insurer  charges  a  flat-rate  insurance  premium 
independent of  the portfolio composition, the equityholders' objective 
is to select the  investment and capital parameters, q and a, such that 
Z(a,q) is maximized. 
The Investment Decision 
To investigate the optimal controls,  first fix a and note that 
[N(dl  - N(d2) I -  aC(0) 
az  2  for q r a 
(q-a)  (7) 
0  otherwise 
az  If a were negative, then -  >  0  and hence q* =  1.  Insolvent banks are  as 
driven to extreme risk.  This strategy is optimal because shareholders 
receive nothing unless the audit is passed.  Indeed, for this case the 
firm may  even select projects with a negative net present value to an 
all-equity firm,  provided their volatilities are sufficiently large. 
For a >  0,  the sign of  is indeterminate.  By  taking the second 
aq 
derivative of equation (7)  for q r a,  we obtain 
Then,  the  function Z(a,q)  is  convex  in  q  over  the  interval  [a,lI. 
Figure 1 illustrates possible functions for any given a.  , 
Given that  the function is flat in q over the interval  [O,al,  the 
* 
optimal investment in risky assets, q , is either in that interval or at 
unity, depending on the value of a.  Specifically, 
~(a,~*)  = Max {Z(a,O),  Z(a,  1)) 
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* 
and a  is that value of a chosen such that 
B 
We  conclude that  for any  capital structure decision, the optimal 
investment decision is either q = 0  or q =  I.~  Firms with capital lower 
than a* will shift thefr portfolio out of  the risk-free asset  into the 
B 
risky investment.  Firms with capital greater than a* will protect their 
B 
charter value by  increasing their risk-free holding and decreasing their 
investment in the risky portfolio. 
As an example, assume the charter value is some fraction, f,  of  the 
deposit base.  Then 
C(0)  =  f(1-a) 
Figure 2 traces out  the break-even point for given values of  f and  cr. 
Note that as cr  increases, banks take on riskier positions.  Therefore, 
for higher  levels of  asset risk, the  range of  capital structures and 
charter values over which the bank will risk its charter is larger.  The 
graph highlights the fact that investment decisions depend critically on 
financing decisions in our model. 
4~ctually,  the optimal investment decision,  q,  is either anywhere in the 
interval  [O,al or  1.  Since  equityholders  are  indifferent  between 
investments in the range [O,al,  we restrict attention to 0.  It is worth 
noting  that  if  the  risky  investment  is a positive net  present  value 
project, then  the  optimal  investment, q*, will  be  either  at  a  or  at 
unity, depending on which offers the greater value. 
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have 
with 
We now turn to the financing decision.  From the above analysis,  we 
Z(u*,q*) = Max (Max {Z(u,O)),  Max {Z(u,l))) 
o=u=1  0*=1 
Assume the charter value is some fraction f of the deposit base.  Then 
Q  For small charter value f, i.e., when 1-f 2  N(-E)/N(-), the Z(u,O) 
2  2 
curve is uniformly higher than Z(u,l).  The optimal capital structure 
Q  should be u =  0  with q =  0.  On the other hand, when 1-f S  N(--;)/N(%), 
the curves E(a,l) and E(u,O) have a unique intersection point for 0  u 
1.  Before the intersection, Z(u,1) is convex, decreasing, and above 
Z(u,O).  Therefore, the optimal capital structure is again u = 0  with q 
=  1,  and the optimal financing decision is for equityholders to provide 
the minimal amount of capital; that is, 
z(u*,~*)  = Max Z(u,q) = Max {Z(0,1),  Z(0,O)) 
a,  q 
111.  Extension to the Two-Period Case 
We have seen that with no opportunities to  revise portfolios, the 
optimal  portfolio  decision  is  always  bang-bang.  If  a  portfolio- 
revision opportunity exists prior to  the audit date, then  the optimal 
solution may not be bang-bang.  This is illustrated below. 
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100, respectively, and  let  f equal 6  percent.  For simplicity, assume 
that  the risk-free rate and  the deposit rate of return are both zero. 
Furthermore, assume that the risky-asset returns are either 20 percent 
or -20 percent in the next two periods.  The probability of an up move 
in each period  is 0.5.  Finally.  assume that  the bank  can revise its 
portfolio at  the beginning of each period and that the audit is at the 
end of the second period. 
TABLE 1:  Comparison of Bang-Bang Strategies  with an Interior Strategy 
Table 1 shows the equity values associated with a few decisions in 
period 1,  followed by optimal decisions in period 2.  From our previous 
analysis, the optimal policy for period 2  is bang-bang.  It  is apparent 
that given an initial strategy q  = 0  (or qo  =  11,  the ability to switch 
0 
decisions in the next period  is valuable.  Note that the values of the 
equity  for  the  strategies  q  =  1  and  qo=  0, followed  by  optimal 
0 
decisions in the next period, happen to be the same (13.47).  However, 
the strategy qz = 7/8,  followed by optimal decisions in the next period, 






We now extend our model to two periods, where the time to an audit 
is t  and where portfolio-revision opportunities exist at  times t  and 
2  0 
OPTIMAL STRATEGY 
IN PERIOD 2 
1 in upstate 
1 in downstate 
0  in upstate 
0  in downstate 
0  in upstate 






www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtl,  respectively.  Let  V,O, El(),  DJO,  and  C (1  be  the  portfolio 
J 
value,  shareholder  equity, deposit  level, and  present  value  of  the 
charter at times t  j  =  0,1,2. Finally, let q  and q  be the fraction 
j'  0  1 
of funds invested in the risky portfolio at times to and ti. 
When the risky portfolio follows a geometric Wiener process, then 
the value of the equity with one period to go,  El(V1), is given by 
VIN(dll)  - (Dl  - GlIN(d12)  for Vl s Vl 
El(V1)  = 
v1 - D~  +  c1  for v1 >  V* 
1 
where 
and V*  satisfies the condition 
1 
The value of Vl, of course, depends on the initial decision qo;  that is, 
where t =  ti-to.  Given an initial capital structure,  a,  and a portfolio 
decision, qo,  the initial equity value, ~~(q~  la),  is given by 
where go is  the  expectation operator  taken over  the  risk-neutralized 
process, dS/S = rdt + cdz.  The optimal q,  qo,  is 
~~(~ila)  =  Max (Eo(qo)} 
osq  I1 
0 
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capital structure decisions are made only at  the  initial period, the 
initial joint capital structure and investment problem is given by 
Z(q*,u*) = Max {  Max {~~(q~lu)}  1 
0<4=1  osqsi 
For the more general n-period problem, numerical procedures based on 
backward dynamic programming can be used to obtain the optimal value of 
the equity and the optimal control policy q(.). 
IV. Numerical Results 
In  this section, we  illustrate how  the  asset  flexibility option 
affects  the  behavior  of  the  banking  firm  under  flat-rate  deposit 
insurance.  Consider a bank with deposits equal to  (1-u) and a charter 
value  equal  to  f(1-a).  Assume  the  riskless rate, r, is 10  percent. 
Figure 3  depicts the net present value of the bank  as a function of u 
for  the  cases where  zero, two, and  four  revision  opportunities are 
allowed  before  the  audit  date.  The  curved  segment  of  the  function 
corresponds to the range of u values where the bank optimally places the 
charter  at  risk.  Conversely,  the  linear  segment  of  the  function 
corresponds to the range of u values where the bank's optimal portfolio 
decision is to set q <  u to ensure that the charter value is captured. 
Figure  3  illustrates  how  the  number  of  portfolio-revision 
opportunities affects the net present value (NPV).  Over the range of u 
where  the NPV  function curves, the  charter  is placed  at  risk.  As  n 
increases, two events occur.  First, the range of u values over which 
the charter is placed at risk expands.  Second, for any given u in this 
range, the NPV increases.  The difference between the NPV curves with n 
>  0  and  n =  0 represents the  value  of  the  flexibility option.  The 
increase  in  the  NPV  of  equity,  due  to  the  flexibility  option,  is 
obtained partly at the expense of the deposit insurer.  Indeed, the fair 
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revisions.  As  a result, empirical estimates that  ignore the value of 
flexibility understate the true value of deposit insurance. 
V. Conclusion 
Optimal  equityholder  decisions  involve  trade-offs  between 
risk-minimizing strategies, which reduce the  likelihood of  losing  the 
charter, and risk-maximizing strategies, which exploit the insurance on 
the deposit base.  Without the ability to respond dynamically to market 
information, optimal financing and  investment policies  are  bang-bang; 
that is, the bank will select extreme positions. 
Given any  flat-rate insurance scheme, incentives will  exist  for 
firms  to  revise  their  portfolios  dynamically  in  response  to  market 
information.  These  dynamic  revisions  are  aimed  at  exploiting  the 
insured-deposit  base  more  fully, while  mitigating  the  likelihood  of 
bankruptcy.  The additional value captured by  equityholders responding 
dynamically to jointly maximize the charter value and deposit insurance 
subsidy, beyond the static value, is captured in the value of the asset 
flexibility option. 
In  the  presence  of  the  asset  flexibility  option,  portfolio 
decisions may  not be  bang-bang and  interior solutions may  be  optimal. 
The  likelihood of  an interior solution may  increase as the  number of 
portfolio-revision opportunities expands.  Moreover, the  value of  the 
insured-deposit base, provided at a flat rate, increases with the number 
of portfolio-revision opportunities. 
Our results suggest that the value of the deposit insurance may be 
significantly  underestimated  by  static  models  because  such  models 
completely  ignore the  flexibility option.  The findings also  suggest 
that  bank  regulators should  factor  the  flexibility option  into  any 
risk-adjusted capital guidelines, and also into closure policies. 
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Figure 1.  The value of equity as a function of the risky-asset 
portfolio weight, q.  There are three possible equity functions.  The 
first panel shows the case where the optimal q equals one.  The second 
and third panels show the cases where the investor is indifferent 
between values of q in the interval [O,a]. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2.  The break-even  value of aas  a function of the charter 
value, f,  and asset volatility, a.  For a given a, the values of a for 
which the bank is indifferent  between setting q - 0 and q = 1  is a 
decreasing function of f.  The range of (a,f) combinations over which 
it becomes optimal to risk the charter increases with a. 
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0 = 20% 
f=5% 
Figure 3.  The impact of flexibility on the net present value (NPV) 
of equity.  The NPV of equity is a decreasing function of initial share- 
holder-contributed capital,  Q.  It is an increasing function of the 
number of revision opportunities for values of Q where deposit insurance 
has value. 
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